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I. Developments in U.S. Courts
A. ATTEMPTS TO ENFORCE IN U.S. COURTS AWARDS ANNULLED BY COURTS
AT THE PLACE OF ARBITRATION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rekindled the smoldering debate in
international arbitration circles over judicial enforcement of annulled arbitration awards
with its decision in Baker Marine (Nigeria), Ltd. v. Chevron (Nigeria), Ltd. ' This important
decision flatly rejects the notion that domestic standards for setting aside an arbitration
award in the United States should apply in a U.S. judicial action to enforce a foreign award
under the New York Convention. Instead, the standards for setting aside an arbitration
award at the place of the arbitration are to be respected if they were properly applied by
the competent courts at that place, and a judgment of that court vacating an award on
proper legal grounds should be respected by U.S. courts under the New York Convention.
In Baker Marine, unlike the much-discussed decision in In re Chromalloy Aeroservices,2
nothing in the parties' arbitration agreement purported to prohibit judicial review of the
award in the courts at the seat of the arbitration-in this case, Lagos, Nigeria-and the
Nigerian arbitration law provided for such review. The Baker Marine decision effectively
relegates Chromalloy to a narrow corner of New York Convention jurisprudence, reasoning
that the Cbromalloy court's decision to enforce an award that had been set aside by an
Egyptian court was justified only because the parties in that case (notably the government
of Egypt itself) had agreed in the contract that there would be "no appeal or other recourse"
against the award.
Further, while the court did not dispute that it has discretion under article V of the New
York Convention to enforce an award that has been annulled at the place of arbitration,'
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1. Baker Marine (Nigeria), Ltd. v. Chevron (Nigeria), Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
2. In Re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
3. Some commentators have argued that the meaning of this language is not to confer discretion to enforce
an award even though the grounds for refusal of enforcement are present, but instead merely to state that these
are the only grounds for refusal of enforcement-i.e., that the court may not refuse enfbrcementon any othergrounds.
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that discretion clearly will not be exercised where the annulment resulted from a lawful
application of the applicable law at the place of arbitration, and that was not foreclosed by
the arbitration agreement. Refusal to enforce the award, in such circumstances, is entirely
consistent with the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act because it respects
the agreement of the parties.4
But the Baker Marine decision will do little to settle the debate over enforcement of
annulled awards, which must inevitably come to focus on illegitimate annulments in courts
at the place of arbitration. U.S. policy favoring enforcement of private agreements to ar-
bitrate is, as the Baker Marine court stated, the appropriate standard to apply in such cases.
Where annulments at the place of arbitration undermine the agreement of the parties to
have their disputes finally resolved by independent arbitrators through a fair procedure and
in accordance with the law chosen by the parties, and free of any political influence or
predisposition against the foreign party, those annulments deserve to be ignored. In such a
case, enforcement of the foreign judgment annulling the award would flatly contradict the
pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act, and undermine the confidence of
international commercial parties in the utility of international arbitration as a method of
resolving disputes.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF AwARDs AGAINST FOREIGN STATES
In Creighton v. Qatar,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that an international arbitration award against a foreign state could not be enforced
under the New York Convention in a U.S. district court, even though there was subject
matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), because the district
court lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign state under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
The case is mainly significant because it highlights an important issue that the court was
not in a position to resolve: whether a foreign state is a "person" entitled to the protections
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For reasons that are unclear, the
plaintiff in Creighton did not argue this point, and addressed the personal jurisdiction issue
only by asserting that Qatar had either waived objections to personal jurisdiction, or that
the "minimum contacts" test for personal jurisdiction was fully satisfied. The D.C. Circuit
held that Qatar (which is not a member state of the New York Convention) did not waive
objections to personal jurisdiction in the United States by agreeing to arbitrate in France,
and did not create jurisdictionally sufficient contacts with the United States merely by
contracting with a U.S.-based company for construction of a hospital in Qatar.
The issue of a foreign state's status as a "person" having Fifth Amendment due process
rights is an important one in the context of enforcement of international arbitration awards.
It may often be the case that foreign states have assets within the United States in the form
of funds held in U.S. bank accounts. Accordingly, the United States may be a practically
attractive forum in which to seek enforcement of an award of money damages, but enforce-
4. A subsequent district court decision in New York adhered to the rationale of Baker Marine, refusing to
enforce an award that had been annulled at the place of arbitration-Venice, Italy-on the lawful ground
under Italian law that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers. Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
5. Creighton v. Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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ment may be frustrated if the bank accounts holding such funds are the foreign state's only
meaningful contact with the United States.
Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists under the statute if there is subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA and effective service of process.6 But courts have held that the
inquiry does not end there, because personal jurisdiction must also be consistent with the
U.S. Constitution.7 In Argentina v. Weltover, the U.S. Supreme Court questioned whether
the personal jurisdiction requirement of the Due Process Clause applies at all to foreign
states, citing its prior holding that a state of the union is not a "person" for purposes of
that clause.' Since that time, one federal district court held that a foreign state is not a
"person" having due process rights under the Constitution;9 the Second Circuit has ques-
tioned whether its earlier holding that a foreign state is a "person" having due process rights
remains good law,10 but did not decide or analyze the question; and two other district courts
avoided the issue because sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction were present
in any event."l
The Constitutional question is a difficult one, particularly because the rationale for find-
ing subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA generally will involve the foreign state or its
instrumentality having engaged in commercial activity, which is to say that, in the particular
case, the foreign state acted more like a person than a sovereign. It is conceivable that such
a distinction could emerge in the case law, with foreign sovereigns having no due process
protection as "persons" in those rare instances-such as the special provisions of the FSIA
related to state-sponsored terrorism' 2I-where subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
exists with respect to a foreign state's governmental, as opposed to commercial, conduct.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATORS' INTERIM ORDERS
The New York Convention does not define the term "award" for purposes of determining
which decisions of arbitral tribunals are subject to recognition and enforcement under the
Convention. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has made an important
contribution to jurisprudence concerning the enforcement of arbitrators' decisions that are
not final awards in Publicis Communications v. True North Communications, Inc."
The decision of the arbitral tribunal involved in Publicis was not an "award"-at least not
according to the arbitral tribunal. The chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal was the Danish
attorney and law professor Allan Philip, one of the most accomplished and experienced
specialists of international arbitration in Europe. The other members of the Tribunal were
French law professor Alain Viandier and former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzen-
bach. The arbitration involved a dispute between two advertising companies, one American
and one French, who had been parties to a joint venture agreement. The arbitral tribunal's
6. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1999).
7. See, e.g., Gilson v. Ireland, 668 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("a statute cannot grant personal
jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it.").
8. Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
9. Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19 (D.D.C. 1998).
10. See Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 1998).
11. See Wasserstein Perella Emerging Mkts. Finance LP v. Formosa, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6146 at 30
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15035 at 10 (D.D.C. 1999).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1999).
13. Publicis Communications v. True North Communications, Inc., 206 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000)
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decision did not involve the merits of the dispute, but only granted a request by the Amer-
ican company to obtain certain tax records from the French company. The arbitral tribunal
labeled its decision an "order," not an award. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that
the order was entitled to enforcement in the United States under the New York Convention.
The court rejected as "extreme and untenable formalism" the arguments of the French
company that the Arbitral Tribunal had denominated its decision an "order," and that the
New York Convention speaks only of enforcement of awards. Reasoning that the essence
of an award is its finality with respect to the issues involved in the decision, the court
concluded that the arbitrators had made a final determination of the U.S. party's entitlement
to obtain the requested tax records, and that on this basis the arbitral decision was enforce-
able under the New York Convention whether it was denominated an award, an order, a
decision, or otherwise.
In support of its conclusion, the court referred to a series of cases decided under the
Federal Arbitration Act, but involving domestic rather than international arbitration, in
which decisions of arbitrators that were not final awards were nevertheless held to be final
and subject to confirmation. The court reasoned that since the New York Convention
"supplements the Federal Arbitration Act ... the logic of decisions applied to the latter
may guide the interpretation of the former." 14 The court further held that it was required
to look at the "substance and effect" of the arbitral decision to decide whether it was entitled
to enforcement, and that here "whether or not Public had to turn over the tax records is
the whole ball of wax ... . Producing the documents wasn't just some procedural matter
-it was the very issue True North wanted arbitrated."'"
The Seventh Circuit's position that substance rather than form should control the de-
termination of whether a particular arbitral decision is an "award" under the New York
Convention is undoubtedly correct, as is its paradigm for making this determination-
whether there has been a final determination of all or a portion of the dispute that the
parties submitted for arbitral determination. However, one may seriously question whether
cases decided under chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act are an appropriate guide to
interpretation of the New York Convention; this approach does not comport with U.S. law
on the interpretation of treaties, or with the purpose of the New York Convention to unify
standards for enforcement of international arbitration awards. Finally, one would hope that
when courts are asked to enforce as "awards" under the New York Convention decisions
that do not complete the arbitral tribunal's work, they will show appropriate deference to
the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral pleadings and proceedings in making decisions about
whether to enforce the decisions. It will often be the case that a careful examination of the
scope of the matters submitted to the arbitral tribunal will shed important light on whether
a particular arbitral decision is properly viewed-in substance-as an award capable of
enforcement under the New York Convention.
D. THE AGREEMENT IN WRITING REQUIREMENT OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had occasion to address the "agreement
in writing" requirement of the New York Convention' 6 in Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark
14. Id. at 729.
15. Id. at. 729-30.
16. United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
VOL. 34, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES 523
International Ltd.7 The court held that arbitration clauses in unsigned purchase orders sent
by the plaintiff to the defendant did not satisfy the Convention's requirement that the
arbitration agreement be in writing, and consequently reversed an order of the district court
granting a motion to compel arbitration.
Article 11(1) of the Convention provides: "[E]ach contracting state shall recognize an
agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them ... concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration." The Convention goes on to define an "agree-
ment in writing" to include "an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of telegrams."
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's position that the signature requirement
under the Convention relates only to an arbitration agreement other than one found in a
contract, and held instead that the signature requirement (or, alternatively, the requirement
of an exchange of letters or telegrams) pertains to arbitration clauses in contracts as well.
The court's reasoning was mainly a matter of applying standard rules of punctuation under
established principles of statutory (and treaty) construction. The conclusion from such rules
of punctuation, that the phrase "signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters
or telegrams" modified both of the preceding phrases-arbitral clause in a contract, and
arbitration agreement-was strongly supported by the court's examination of the same
provision in two other official languages of the Convention-French and Spanish-which
had also been working languages during the U.N. conference on the drafting of the New
York Convention. The court also found that the drafting history of the New York Con-
vention resolved any doubt about the proper construction, since in the Working Group's
commentary it was clear that the requirement of a signature would apply equally to contracts
containing arbitration clauses and separate arbitration agreements.
E. WHEN 1HAVE THE PARTIES AGREED TO "ARBITRATE ARBITRABILITY"?
Since the Supreme Court's decision in First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan,8 there has been much
discussion and a handful of decisions concerning the proper allocation between courts and
arbitral tribunals of decisions concerning the proper parties to the arbitrable dispute and
the scope of arbitrable issues. Two decisions within the past year reflect different ap-
proaches. One, it is submitted, is more correct than the other.
In Kaplan, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of what is the appropriate standard
of judicial review of an arbitral tribunal's decision concerning arbitrability of a dispute, and
held that the appropriate standard of review depends on whether the parties' arbitration
agreement called for arbitral determination of such questions:
Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate that dispute ... so the question "who has the primary power to decide arbitrability"
turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter. Did the parties agree to submit the
arbitrability question itself to arbitration? If so, then the court's standard for reviewing the
arbitrator's decision about that matter should not differ from the standard courts apply when
they review any other matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. 19
17. Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999).
18. First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
19. Id. at 943.
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The Kaplan Court then went on to discuss "how a court should decide whether the parties
have agreed to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration," and in this regard stated:
Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is "clea[r]
and unmistakabl[e]" evidence that they did so .... In this manner the law treats silence or
ambiguity about the question "who (primarily) should decide arbitrability" differently from the
way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question "whether a particular merits-related
dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement"....10
The former question-the "who (primarily) should decide arbitrability" question-is rather
arcane. A party often might not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having
arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers .... And, given the principle that a party can
be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically agreed to submit to arbitration, one can
understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the "who should
decide arbitrability" point as giving arbitrators that power .... I
Concluding this elaborate discussion, the Court held that the petitioner had not mani-
fested a "clear willingness to arbitrate that issue, i.e., a willingness to be effectively bound by the
arbitrators' decision on that point."22 (emphasis added). This, in a nutshell, appears to be the
applicable standard laid down by Kaplan.
Does a contract that provides for arbitration of "all disputes concerning ... interpretation of
this agreement" manifest a "clear willingness" to arbitrate arbitrability? One judge of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York so held in Bancol Y Cia. S. En C. v.
Bancolombia S.A.,23 and on the basis of this language alone directed the parties to submit to
the arbitral tribunal the question of whether claims under the U.S. securities laws were
within the scope of their agreement to arbitrate. Such a result seems precisely contrary to
the rationale of Kaplan, however, because when the parties agreed to arbitrate "all disputes
concerning.., the interpretation of the agreement" there can be little doubt that what they
had in mind was the operative provisions of the agreement, and not the arbitration clause
itselfl
A more convincing rationale for sending issues of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal
exists where the parties have agreed to arbitrate under rules that specifically invest the
arbitrators with competence to decide upon their own jurisdiction. Such was the case in a
recent Ninth Circuit decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. PT Multipolar Corp.,2 4 where the
parties had agreed to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL Rules. Article 21 of those Rules
provides that "[tihe arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it has
no jurisdiction." One might well argue that merely agreeing to arbitrate by rules that confer
certain powers on the arbitrators does not imply a contractual removal of those powers
from a court. Neither the UNCITRAL Rules nor any of the principal sets of institutional
rules purport to limit expressly the ability of a litigant to obtain an arbitrability ruling from
a court.
20. Id. at 944.
21. Id. at 945.
22. Id. at 946.
23. Bancol y Cia. S. En C. v. Bancolombia S.A., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
24. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. PT Multipolar Corp., 202 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1999) (This is an unpublished
opinion, citation of which is subject to the Rules of the Ninth Circuit).
VOL. 34, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES 525
A recent case illustrates how entangled these issues can become. A U.S. company com-
menced an action against a foreign state and one of its instrumentalities in a federal district
court, invoking jurisdiction under the FSIA. The state instrumentality responded by filing
an ICC arbitration. The U.S. company countered by contesting ICC jurisdiction over the
state entity's case, and by filing its own ICC arbitration against the state itself. In essence,
the issue was whether the state, the state entity, or both, were parties to the arbitration
agreement-and whether the court, the ICC court, or the arbitral tribunal should resolve
those questions in the first instance. The U.S. court deferred to the ICC court in the first
instance by staying the case for six months, and then deferred to the arbitral tribunal by
extending the stay after the ICC Court referred the jurisdiction issues to the arbitrators.
This seems to be a sensible solution, particularly since the arbitration process had been
invoked on at least two sides of the triangle. But where one party commences a lawsuit in
court, believing the dispute is not arbitrable or hoping the other side will waive its right to
compel arbitration, the correct answer seems less obvious. If the defendant responds with
a motion to compel arbitration, invoking the New York or Panama Convention, the Federal
Arbitration Act empowers the court to "direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the
agreement . 2I (emphasis added). This language in the Federal Arbitration Act would
appear to imply certainly the power, and arguably the duty, to determine the scope of the
arbitrable issues in the absence of an explicit manifestation in the contract itself that the
parties committed that issue to arbitral determination.
II. May an Arbitral Institution or Court Change the Place of
Arbitration Agreed to in the Contract?
This question, intensely debated in certain quarters during the past year, is closely related
to the question of enforcement of annulled awards. Suppose a foreign investor has agreed
-improvidently in hindsight-to arbitrate in a place that has become a clearly hostile legal
environment, where the host state party (perhaps the state itself) is virtually assured of
obtaining the annulment of any unfavorable award in national courts that are overtly hostile
to the foreign investor or the state of which it is a citizen. Should an arbitral institution or
court be able to intervene to prevent that result by changing the place of arbitration agreed
to in the contract? If courts will generally refuse to enforce an annulled award, has the
foreign investor been deprived of the benefit of his arbitration bargain-final and binding
resolution by an independent arbitral tribunal free of parochial bias-if the place of arbi-
tration cannot be changed, and judicial annulment at that place is virtually assured?
Arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL and the principal institutions administering inter-
national arbitrations provide no clear answers. They generally state that the place of arbi-
tration shall be as agreed to by the parties or, absent such agreement, that the institution
shall select the place of arbitration. Such rules also provide that the arbitral tribunal, after
consultation with the parties, may elect to hold hearings and meetings at any suitable lo-
cation. But such a change of physical venue does not alter the legal significance of the chosen
place of the arbitration. Most significantly, the lex arbitri of the place of arbitration, in-
cluding its provisions for appeals and other recourse to the courts in connection with ar-
bitration, will govern the proceedings.
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 303(a).
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Some institutional rules such as article 35 of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Rules, specify that, in all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the insti-
tution (such as the ICC International Court of Arbitration) shall make every effort to ensure
the enforceability of the award. But how to apply such a rule can be a vexing question.
If the contract contains a choice of a place of arbitration, is the matter expressly covered
by the rule that the parties' agreement should be enforced-however much the conditions
at the place of arbitration might have changed since the signing of the contract? If con-
tractual doctrines of changed circumstances or impossibility of performance (in the civil
law, the dau ula rebus sic stantibus) might in extreme circumstances permit the original agree-
ment on the place of arbitration to be set aside, is this a proper decision to be taken by an
institution like the ICC Court, or is the matter more properly left to the arbitral tribunal?
A sensible approach to this issue may be to interpret the parties' arbitration clause in
light of the presumed hierarchy of their objectives. At the top rung of the hierarchy is the
agreement to arbitrate itself: first and foremost, the parties elected to resolve their disputes
before arbitrators rather than national courts. Agreements on a particular set of institutional
rules, and on the place of arbitration, generally should be regarded as subsidiary aspects of
the arbitration clause, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary. If the parties agree
upon arbitration under the arbitration rules of a particular national chamber of commerce,
it would be ludicrous to suppose that they wished to be remitted to trial before a national
court if that chamber of commerce ceased to administer international arbitrations.
The choice of a place of arbitration should be similarly viewed, absent clear evidence to
the contrary. If annulment of an arbitration award that is unfavorable to one of the parties
is virtually assured, then enforcement of the arbitration agreement as written undermines
its essential purpose; strict enforcement of the clause effectively remits the case to the
national courts and turns the arbitration into an empty formality. Courts, arbitrators, and
arbitral institutions should have the fortitude to apply these principles, and to avoid rigid
enforcement of written agreements to arbitrate that would produce absurd and unintended
results.
MI. Developments Under the 1996 U.K. Arbitration Act
Cases decided in the United Kingdom during the past year continue to show that the
1996 U.K. Arbitration Act (1996 Act) has been generally effective in its mission to enhance
party autonomy and limit judicial intervention in and review of international arbitration
awards.
In an important and widely-discussed decision concerning the independence and impar-
tiality of arbitrators, AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Corp.,2 6 the Commercial Court rejected a
post-award challenge based upon the alleged lack of independence of the chairman of an
ICC arbitral tribunal who had inadvertently failed to disclose his status as a nonexecutive
director of a competitor of the claimant that had, in fact, competed with the claimant
unsuccessfully to obtain the multibillion-dollar international contract that was at issue in
the case.27 The claimant pressed the matter to the Commercial Court even after the ICC
International Court of Arbitration had rejected the challenge.s While this case actually
26. AT&T Corp. v. Saudi Cable Corp., I Lloyd's Rep. 22 (Q.B. 1999).
27. The arbitrator involved was L. Yves Fortier, QC of Montreal, President of the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration, and a former Ambassador of Canada to the United Nations.
28. Two interim awards on liability had been entered prior to claimant's discovery of Mr. Fortier's status
as a nonexecutive director of the Canadian telecommunication company Nortel. After the ICC rejected the
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arose under the predecessor to the 1996 Arbitration Act (the inception of the arbitration
having pre-dated the 1996 Act), the new Act's provisions on disqualification of arbitrators
had a strong influence on the outcome. Longmore, in his opinion, noted that the 1996 Act,
unlike the ICC Rules, does not introduce the concept of arbitrator "independence" but
instead speaks only in terms of matters that give rise to justifiable doubts about the impar-
tiality of the arbitrator. This supported the conclusion that the ICC's rule of finality re-
garding the ICC Court's rulings on arbitrator challenges29 should be respected, and that
the question of independence should not be revisited. But this was not the end of the matter
because the court considered it necessary, in a case governed by English lex arbitri, to
consider whether there was actual or presumed bias that required setting aside the awards.
The court concluded that there was none-there was no pecuniary interest in the outcome
that would require automatic disqualification, and there was no real danger of unconscious
bias against the claimant, given the arbitrator's very peripheral role in the affairs of the
competitor on whose board he sat as a nonexecutive director.
In another case, Sanghi Polyesters Ltd. (India) v. International Investor KCSC,30 the Com-
mercial Court rejected an application to vacate an award made in London under the 1998
ICC Rules, holding that under section 69 of the 1996 Act, which permits an appeal on a
question of law unless the parties had otherwise agreed, the appeal was barred because
article 24 of the 1988 ICC Rules provided that the parties waived rights of appeal to the
extent permitted by law. By accepting the ICC Rules and article 24 in particular, the parties
had "otherwise agreed" that there would be no appeal on questions of law. In the same case,
the court also refused to overturn the award on the ground specified in section 69(3)-that
the award is "obviously wrong" on a question of law-concluding without lengthy analysis
that the sole arbitrator's application of Islamic banking law appeared to be correct.
InAl-Naimi v. Islamic Press Service, Inc.,3" the Court of Appeal issued a significant decision
concerning the allocation of power between judges and arbitrators over contested issues of
arbitral jurisdiction under the 1996 Act. The court held that under section 9 of the 1996
Act, it is for the court to resolve a disputed issue of jurisdiction that is presented to it-
including an issue of whether there is an arbitration agreement or not-if the answer is
clear. Otherwise, the issue falls within the discretion of the court, which may either order
a trial of the issue if there is a triable issue of fact, or remit the matter to the arbitral tribunal
for decision, as permitted (but not required) by section 30 of the 1996 Act. Significantly,
the court outlined a practical approach to the exercise of discretion by trial courts in re-
taining or referring to arbitrators disputed issues of arbitral jurisdiction. Where, for ex-
ample, at least some issues are inevitably going to require a hearing before the arbitrators,
the court reasoned, it may be entirely practical to refer arbitrability issues to the arbitrators.
However, where the parties are willing to have the arbitrability issue determined on affi-
challenge, the tribunal proceeded to enter a final award assessing damages. All three awards were the subject
of the Commercial Court proceeding.
One may note that claimant AT&T already had two interim awards on liability entered against it at the time
it lodged the first challenge in the ICC Court. In a sense it had little to lose, although from a distance one
cannot know what issues remained in the damages phase of the case. Further, failure to raise the matter with
the ICC Court would have seriously impaired any challenge based on lack of partiality in the U.K. courts.
29. Art. 2.13 of the 1998 ICC Rules.
30. Sanghi Polyesters Ltd. (India) v. International Investor KCSC, transcript (Q.B. 2000).
31. AI-Naimi v. Islamic Press Service, Inc., THE TiMEs, Mar. 16, 2000 (Eng. C.A. 2000).
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davits without oral testimony, judicial resolution of the question is generally favored in the
interest of speed and efficiency.
IV. Awards by Truncated Tribunals: The Case of the
Kidnapped Arbitrator
On September 26, 1999, an ad hoc international arbitral tribunal acting under the
UNCITRAL Rules issued interim awards in two consolidated cases in which the Republic
of Indonesia was the Respondent. The awards have been published in full text in Mealey's
InternationalArbitration Report." They provide an important lesson in how foreign investor
parties and international arbitral tribunals can address the difficulties presented by an in-
transigent state party.
The dispute arose from a $180 million arbitration award in May 1999 in favor of the
claimants and against the Indonesian State Electricity Corporation. Based on a letter to the
claimants from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, the claimants alleged
that Indonesia was liable for the state entity's nonpayment of the award.
A. REFUSAL TO ACCEPT "SERVICE" OF THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM
After entry of the final award against the state entity, the claimant served its Statement
of Claim on the Republic of Indonesia by delivering same to its counsel. This attempt at
service was met by a letter rejecting the pleading and physically returning it to the claimant's
counsel. The Arbitral Tribunal, when notified of these events, reacted in the strongest of
terms, delivering a letter to counsel for the Republic of Indonesia reminding it that it had
accepted the Arbitral Tribunal, and that while it was free to make any arguments or con-
tentions permitted by the UNCITRAL Rules, "it is not open to you to decide which commu-
nications you accept and which you ignore. You are in no position to 'reject service.' "
B. ATTEMPT TO ENJOIN THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS IN INDONESIAN COURTS
Within days after service of the Statement of Claim, the state entity commenced an action
in the Jakarta District Court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings. This action was met
with a fascinating response from the Arbitral Tribunal. While avowing its complete respect
for the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, it referred to remarks by a former president
of the International Court ofJustice, Emuardo Jimenez de Arechaga, that stated that, under
international law, "... the judgment given by a judicial authority emanates from an organ
of the state in just the same way as a law promulgated by the legislature or a decision taken
by the executive." The Tribunal's message to the state was also clear: if forced to take a
position, it would not hesitate to condemn actions of the Indonesian judiciary as unlawful
manipulations by the state party to obstruct the arbitration.
C. THREAT TO PROSECUTE AND IMPRISON CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
When the state entity published in the Jakarta press remarks critical of the claimant's
counsel and threatened to prosecute and imprison counsel and its witnesses if they pro-
32. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Indonesia, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, A-1 (2000); Patna Power
Ltd. v. Indonesia, 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, B-1 (2000).
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ceeded with the arbitration in violation of a Jakarta District Court injunction, the Arbitral
Tribunal reacted promptly by notifying the parties that it would consider changing the
physical venue of the arbitration to remove it from Jakarta, and from the obvious threats
to the tribunal's jurisdiction."
D. ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTION BY JAKARTA DISTRICT COURT
Following issuance of an injunction against the arbitration by the Jakarta District Court,
including a prospective fine of $1 million per day for any violation of the injunction, the
Arbitral Tribunal, after receiving extensive submissions from the parties and the experts
concerning the consequences of the injunction, issued a procedural order, determining:
(1) that the purported injunction violated international law, as incorporated into Indonesian
law; (2) that Indonesia's refusal to proceed with the arbitration based upon the purported
injunction was a breach of the arbitration agreement; (3) that Indonesia was therefore in
default; and (4) that the physical venue of further proceedings would be changed to The
Hague, without any change of the legal seat of the arbitration, which would remain in
Jakarta.
E. CHALLENGE TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Following the procedural order, Indonesia asked the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal
to resign on grounds of bias and conflict of interest of the chairman's law firm, and expressed
the same views in a letter to the Secretary-General of the International Center for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The chairman refused to resign, finding the claims
of bias and conflict of interest to be groundless, and the application motivated solely by
Indonesia's objections to the terms of the procedural order.
F. KIDNAPPING OF INDONESIA'S APPOINTED ARBITRATOR, AND THE PENULTIMATE RULING
THAT THE Two REMAINING ARBITRATORS COULD PROCEED WITH THE CASE
The Tribunal's interim awards fully described the astonishing circumstances of the ap-
prehension of the Indonesia-appointed arbitrator, apparently by agents of the state, after
his arrival in the Amsterdam airport to attend the hearings in The Hague. In its final award,
the Tribunal comprehensively set forth the authorities in international law clearly sup-
porting the ability of the remaining two members of an arbitral tribunal to proceed to a
final award despite the inability of the third arbitrator to participate. 4 In particular, the
Tribunal relied upon the writings ofJudge Stephen Schwebel, president of the International
Court of Justice. Judge Schwebel wrote in a series of lectures delivered in 1987, which
surveyed, inter alia, the experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal:
Withdrawal of an arbitrator from an international arbitral tribunal which is not approved or
authorized by the tribunal is wrong under customary international law and the general prin-
ciples of law recognized and applied in the practice of international arbitration. It generally
will constitute a violation of the treaty or contract constituting the tribunal, if not in terms
33. Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal "may hear witnesses and hold
meetings for consultation among its members at any place it deems appropriate, having regard to the circum-
stances of the arbitration." Id.
34. 15 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 2, A-1 (2000).
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then because the intention of the parties normally cannot be deemed to have authorized such
withdrawal.
One can only applaud the extraordinary fortitude and intellectual rigor with which the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal approached their task in this case while in a virtually
constant state of siege. Further, this entire drama unfolded over a period of approximately
four months from the filing of the Statement of Claim to the final award. International
arbitrators and counsel for parties in such proceedings may well refer to these awards, for
generations to come, for the guidance they provide in combating a deliberate campaign of
sabotage against the arbitration proceedings by the state party.
V. Internet Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Any recap of developments in international commercial arbitration over the past twelve
months would be woefully incomplete without discussion of the quite extraordinary emer-
gence of an entirely new dispute resolution system relating to Internet domain name dis-
putes, in which the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been a principal
innovator."
The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center has become the world's leading provider
of dispute resolution services for implementation of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (ICANN Policy) adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) on August 26, 1999. Those services give effect to the Rules
for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (ICANN Rules) approved by
ICANN on October 24, 1999, and are implemented by the WIPO Center's Supplemental
Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy that entered into effect on
December 1, 1999.36
Public discussions of these dispute resolution services often focus on the online features
of the dispute resolution services themselves, such as the WIPO's Supplemental Rules pro-
viding for e-mail filing or web site posting of pleadings. Somewhat submerged in these
discussions (or so it may appear to the uninitiated) are the roots of the system in the-law
and tradition of international commercial arbitration. Those aspects of the system are
briefly summarized here, and the reader is encouraged to visit the WIPO and ICANN web
sites to examine the policies and procedures in all of their detail.
A. AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
To register a domain name with ICANN, an applicant must complete a Registration
Agreement. The Registration Agreement incorporates by reference the ICANN Policy,
which provides that the registrant agrees to resolve disputes over the registration and use
of an Internet domain name registered by the registrant pursuant to the ICANN Rules.
The ICANN Rules, in turn, require the registrant to refer the dispute to arbitration under
35. At the beginning of 2000, there were three "approved providers" of domain name dispute resolution
services sanctioned by the ICANN: the WIPO, the National Arbitration Forum, and Disputes. org/eResolution
Consortium. See <http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm>.
36. Comprehensive information about the WIPO Center and its domain name dispute resolution proce-
dures, including full texts of Administrative Panel Decisions, may be found on the WIPO web site <http://
www.wipo.org>, or more directly at <http://arbiter.wipo.int>.
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the auspices of one of the ICANN-approved dispute resolution providers-which the reg-
istrant may select at the time it files the complaint.
B. SCOPE OF ARBITRABLE ISSUES
Proceedings concerning domain name registrations are identified as "Mandatory Ad-
ministrative Proceedings" (MAPs). In such proceedings, the claimant must prove the ex-
istence of three elements: (1) that a registrant's domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (2) that the
registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (3) that
the registrant's domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. Thus, any
dispute that does not involve all of these elements is not an arbitrable dispute under the
ICANN Policy and Rules, and no other disputes are within the scope of the submission to
arbitration. This is expressly addressed in paragraph 5 of the ICANN Rules.
37
C. AvAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES
While submission of the dispute to a MAP is required, either party may also elect to seek
relief in court, either before or after the submission of the dispute to a MAP. If the losing
party in the MAPs notifies the provider within ten days after the Administrative Panel
Decision that it has commenced a lawsuit in a proper jurisdiction, the decision will not be
implemented and the ICANN will not cancel the domain name registration pending com-
pletion of the court proceedings. Thus, the ICANN and its dispute resolution providers
have created what amounts to an optionally-binding arbitration procedure.
D. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS
The complainant may propose to have the dispute resolved by a sole arbitrator or a three-
member panel. If the complainant chooses a three-member panel, then it must submit three
candidates to serve as one of the arbitrators, who may (but need not) be drawn from an
ICANN-Provider's list of panelists. The respondent may reject a complainant's proposal
to have a sole arbitrator, and even in that there must be a three-member panel. The Provider
will appoint one candidate from each side's list of three and, to select the Presiding Panelist,
will submit to the parties a list of five candidates, which the parties are invited to return
with the rank-ordered preferences indicated.
E. PROCEEDINGS, HEARINGS, AND DECISIONS
Any written submissions beyond the complaint and the response (and the documents
annexed thereto) are in the discretion of the panel. There are to be no in-person hearings
(including teleconference or videoconference) unless the panel so determines, exceptionally.
The panel shall resolve the dispute in accordance with the ICANN Rules and "any rules
and principles of law that it deems applicable." (emphasis added). A three-member panel must
37. "All other disputes between you and any party other than us regarding your domain name registration
that are not brought pursuant to the mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of paragraph 4 shall be
resolved between you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be
available."
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decide by majority. The panel's decision must be in writing, stating the reasons on which
it is based. Strict time limits for completion of the proceedings are imposed.
Since initiating its services as a Provider in December 1999, the WVIPO has received in
excess of 200 cases, involving registrants from more than forty countries. A survey of the
emerging jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article. But it may be useful to pose
several questions for further consideration as the volume of decisions mount: (1) what is
the applicable law in disputes between registrants of different nationalities; (2) will parties
ever have occasion to seek to vacate or enforce a panel decision, or will ICANN's cancel-
lation of the losing party's registration (from the winner's perspective) and the right to start
a lawsuit (from the loser's perspective) eliminate nearly all need for such proceedings; and
(3) will the mechanism generally be effective in resolving disputes because the results will
be broadly accepted by the parties, or will a large percentage of the cases find their way
into the courts?
For the time being, the dispute resolution community can only watch with fascination
as this very visible and very active new sub-field of international arbitration evolves.
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